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Abstract
We compare the event calculus and temporal action logics (TAL), two formalisms for reasoning about action and change.
We prove that, if the formalisms are restricted to integer time, inertial fluents, and relational fluents, and if TAL action type
specifications are restricted to definite reassignment of a single fluent, then the formalisms are not equivalent. We argue that
equivalence cannot be restored by using more general TAL action type specifications. We prove however that, if the formalisms are
further restricted to single-step actions, then they are logically equivalent.
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1. Introduction
Reasoning about action and change is a fundamental area of research within artificial intelligence. This is an im-
portant area because action and change are pervasive aspects of the world in which intelligent agents operate. Over the
years, a number of formalisms and frameworks for reasoning about action and change have been developed. Among
them are the situation calculus [25,33], the event calculus [19,36], features and fluents [34,35], action languages [7–9],
and the fluent calculus [12,41,42].
Although there has been some cross-pollination, the various formalisms have been developed in relative isolation,
and the relationship between them is not always well understood. But understanding the relationship between the
formalisms is important for the following reasons:
• It helps to advance the field. An understanding of the space of possible formalisms and where each formalism is
situated in this space is essential to their refinement.
• It enables sharing of reasoning tools. A number of reasoning tools are available, as shown in Table 1. If problems
in one formalism can be translated into another formalism, they can be solved using reasoning tools for the other
formalism.
• It enables sharing of problem libraries developed for each of the formalisms and reasoning tools.
• It facilitates collaboration. Researchers working using one formalism can understand and build on the results of
researchers using another formalism.
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Tools for reasoning about action and change
Formalism Tool
Situation calculus KM [3]
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/mfkb/km.html
Event calculus Event calculus planner [39]
http://www.iis.ee.ic.ac.uk/~mpsha/planners.html
Discrete Event Calculus Reasoner [28]
http://decreasoner.sourceforge.net/
TAL VITAL [20]
http://www.ida.liu.se/~jonkv/vital/
C+ CCALC [9,23]
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/cc/
E E-RES [14,15]
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uczcrsm/LanguageE/
Fluent calculus FLUX [43]
http://www.fluxagent.org/
Two major streams of research in reasoning about action and change are temporal action logics (TAL) [4–6,21],
which has its origins in the features and fluents framework, and the event calculus [29,37]. TAL and the event calculus
appear to be similar because they both have characterizations in classical logic and both use linear time. But their
exact relationship has been unclear.
In this paper, we compare the event calculus with support for events with duration [26,37] and TAL 1.0 [4,5].1
We start by restricting the event calculus and TAL 1.0 to integer time, inertial fluents, and relational fluents. We
further restrict TAL 1.0 action type specifications to definite reassignment of a single fluent. We then prove that these
restricted versions are not equivalent. We show that equivalence cannot be restored even if more general TAL action
type specifications are used. We then further restrict the two formalisms to single-step actions and prove that these
versions are logically equivalent.
2. Past work
In the past, four approaches have been used to compare formalisms for reasoning about action and change:
(1) Two formalisms are proved to be logically equivalent.
(2) A syntactic translation is defined from a domain description in one formalism to a domain description in another
formalism, and the two domain descriptions are proved to entail the same results. Translations may be provided
in one or both directions.
(3) Semantic (model theoretic) conditions are defined under which a domain description in one formalism matches
a domain description in another formalism, and matching domain descriptions are proved to entail the same
results.
(4) A general formalism is defined, and formalisms are shown to be special cases of the general formalism.
In order to ease comparison, the formalisms are often extended or restricted in various ways.
The first approach is used by Kowalski and Sadri [17,18], who consider a version of the event calculus extended
with branching time, but without concurrent events, continuous change, and release from the commonsense law of
inertia. They show that this version of the event calculus is logically equivalent to a version of the situation calculus
similar to that of Reiter [32]. The first approach is also used by Mueller [27], who proves that, if the domain of the
timepoint sort is restricted to the integers, the continuous event calculus is logically equivalent to a discrete version of
the event calculus.
We use the first approach in this paper.
1 We use the variant of TAL 1.0 in which actions are treated as first-class citizens [5, pp. 19–20].
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of action language A [8] into three versions of the situation calculus [1,30,31]. He asserts that for any sequence of
events, the A domain description and the situation calculus translations entail the same truth values of fluents.
Thielscher [40] restricts A to a single sequence of actions, and restricts ego world semantics [35] to inertial fluents,
relational fluents, and single-step actions. He defines a translation from A domain descriptions to ego world semantics
domain descriptions, and defines a translation from ego world semantics domain descriptions to A domain descrip-
tions. He sketches proofs that in both cases, the models of the domain descriptions entail the same event occurrences
and fluent truth values.
Giunchiglia and Lifschitz [11] define a translation from unrestricted domain descriptions of action language C [10]
into the situation calculus, and define a classical logic translation of the transition semantics of C domain descriptions.
They prove that for any domain description, the two translations are logically equivalent. They also define a translation
from restricted C domain descriptions to TAL domain descriptions, and define another classical logic translation of
the transition semantics of C domain descriptions. They prove that for any domain description, the first translation is
a conservative extension of the second translation.
The third approach is used by Miller and Shanahan [26], who consider a version of the E action language [13] and
a version of the event calculus without release from the commonsense law of inertia, continuous change, and state
constraints. They define semantic conditions under which an E domain description matches an event calculus domain
description. They prove that, if an E domain description matches an event calculus domain description, the domain
descriptions entail the same event occurrences and fluent truth values.
The fourth approach is used by Van Belleghem, Denecker, and De Schreye [44], who define a general formalism
that encompasses both the situation calculus and a version of the event calculus without concurrent events, continuous
change, and release from the commonsense law of inertia. They describe how the situation calculus and this version
of the event calculus are obtained by restricting the general formalism.
Bennett and Galton [2] define a versatile event logic (VEL) whose semantics includes a number of formalisms for
temporal reasoning, and present ways of describing the situation calculus and the event calculus within VEL. They
consider a version of the event calculus without continuous change and release from the commonsense law of inertia.
A related approach is that of Sandewall [35], who defines ontological families and the intended models of a do-
main description of a given family. The correctness of any particular formalism is then assessed against these formal
specifications.
3. The event calculus and TAL
How shall we go about proving logical equivalence of the event calculus with events with duration and TAL 1.0?
As shown in Table 2, the formalisms do not support the same features. In addition, the formalisms do not address
indirect effects and nondeterministic effects using the same language features. Indirect effects are represented in the
event calculus using causal constraints and effect constraints [38], whereas they are represented in TAL 1.0 using
dependency constraints [5, pp. 16–18]. Nondeterministic effects are represented in the event calculus using determin-
ing fluents [37, pp. 419–420], whereas they are represented in TAL 1.0 using disjunctions in reassignment operators
[4, pp. 35–36].
At this point, we have two choices. We can either extend the formalisms with their missing features, or we can
restrict the formalisms to their common features. We choose the second approach. We disallow causal constraints,
continuous change, continuous time, and effect constraints in the event calculus, and we disallow dependency con-
straints, disjunctions in reassignment operators, durational fluents, and functional fluents in TAL 1.0.
In order to prove logical equivalence, we would like to characterize the event calculus and TAL 1.0 using the same
classical language. TAL 1.0 domain descriptions are written in a specialized language L(ND) and then translated
into a classical language L(FL). The important translation rules are provided in Appendix A. Event calculus domain
descriptions are also expressed in a classical language. But TAL 1.0 L(FL) and the event calculus use different
symbol sets. TAL 1.0 L(FL) uses Holds, Occurs, and Occlude, whereas the event calculus as we have restricted it
uses HoldsAt, InitiallyP, InitiallyN, Happens, Initiates, Terminates, Clipped, and Declipped. How shall we reconcile
these two languages?
In TAL 1.0, the effects of events are specified using L(ND) action type specifications of the form
[τ, τ ′]α β
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Features of the event calculus and TAL 1.0
Feature Event calculus TAL 1.0
Causal constraints 
Concurrent events  
Context-sensitive effects  
Continuous change 
Continuous time 
Dependency constraints 
Disjunctions in reassignment operators 
Durational fluents 
Effect constraints 
Events with duration  
Functional fluents 
Inertial fluents  
State constraints  
where τ and τ ′ are timepoints, α is an action, and β is a formula that specifies the preconditions and postconditions
of α. Postconditions are defined using the R, X, and I reassignment operators. The R operator specifies that a fluent
is released from the commonsense law of inertia during a time interval and is constrained to have a particular value
at the end of the interval. The I operator specifies that a fluent is released from the commonsense law of inertia
during a time interval and is constrained to have a particular value during the interval. The X operator specifies that
a fluent is released from the commonsense law of inertia during a time interval. Note that a fluent released from the
commonsense law of inertia by a reassignment operator may be further constrained by other parts of the same action
type specification or by different axioms such as state constraints.
The effects of actions are often2 specified using L(ND) action type specifications of the form
[τ, τ ′]α [τ ]γ → R((τ, τ ′](¬)β) (1)
where τ and τ ′ are timepoints, α is an action, γ is a formula, and β is a fluent. This represents that, if α occurs from
τ to τ ′, and γ is true at τ , then β will be of indeterminate truth value from τ + 1 to τ ′ − 1 inclusive, and will be true
(false) starting at τ ′. A specification of this form is translated into an L(FL) formula
Occurs(τ, τ ′, α) → (γ ′ → (¬)Holds(τ ′, β) ∧ ∀t (τ < t ∧ t  τ ′ → Occlude(t, β))) (2)
where γ ′ is the L(FL) translation of [τ ]γ .3 Notice that (2) is logically equivalent to the conjunction of the formulas:
Occurs(τ, τ ′, α) ∧ γ ′ → (¬)Holds(τ ′, β)
Occurs(τ, τ ′, α) ∧ γ ′ ∧ τ < t ∧ t  τ ′ → Occlude(t, β)
In order to reconcile the two languages, we assume that all TAL 1.0 action type specifications are of the form (1).
Given this assumption we show in Sections 4 and 6 that the restricted TAL 1.0 is not equivalent to the restricted
event calculus. We argue in Section 7 that, even if we relax this assumption and allow more general action type
specifications, we still cannot obtain equivalence.
Given this assumption we can express [τ, τ ′]α [τ ]γ → R((τ, τ ′]β) as γ ′ → Initiates(α,β, τ ), and [τ, τ ′]α
[τ ]γ → R((τ, τ ′]¬β) as γ ′ → Terminates(α,β, τ ), just as in the event calculus. We must then add the following
domain-independent axioms to TAL:
Occurs(t1, t2, e) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t1) → Holds(t2, f ) (3)
Occurs(t1, t2, e) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t1) → ¬Holds(t2, f ) (4)
2 46 of the 68 unique action type specifications provided with the latest release of VITAL, version 2.999.910 alpha of October 8, 2003, are
of this form or can be rewritten as several specifications of this form. 8 specifications are of the form [τ, τ ′]α [τ ]γ → I ((τ, τ ′](¬)β) where
β is a durational fluent, 5 specifications involve R([τ ′](¬)β), 3 specifications use disjunctions in reassignment operators, and the remaining
6 specifications use other combinations of reassignment operators. Current TAL domains are more complex, but have not yet been added to VITAL.
3 For example, the L(FL) translation of [τ ]β1 ∧ ¬β2 is Holds(τ,β1) ∧ ¬Holds(τ,β2). See Appendix A for more details.
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Furthermore, we treat the TAL 1.0 L(FL) predicates Holds(t, f ), Occurs(t1, t2, e), and Occlude(t, f ), and the
event calculus predicates InitiallyP(f ), InitiallyN(f ), Clipped(t1, f, t2), and Declipped(t1, f, t2) as abbreviations.
We use a many-sorted language with equality, with sorts for events, fluents, and timepoints. The domain of the
timepoint sort is the integers. The language has the following predicates:
• HoldsAt(f, t): Fluent f is true at timepoint t .
• Happens3(e, t1, t2): Event e occurs from timepoint t1 to timepoint t2.
• Initiates(e, f, t1): If event e occurs from timepoint t1 to timepoint t2, then fluent f will be true after t2.
• Terminates(e, f, t1): If event e occurs from timepoint t1 to timepoint t2, then fluent f will be false after t2.
3.1. TALA axiomatization
We use the following axiomatization of the restricted TAL 1.0, which we call TALA. We start with definitions of
Holds and Occurs.
TALA1 Holds(t, f ) def≡ HoldsAt(f, t)
TALA2 Occurs(t1, t2, e)
def≡ Happens3(e, t1, t2 − 1)
Note the difference in the ending timepoint t2 between Occurs and Happens3.
TAL uses circumscription [22,24] of the Occlude and Occurs predicates [21, p. 26], just as the event calculus
uses circumscription of Initiates, Terminates, and Happens [37, p. 417]. We continue with a definition based on
the circumscription of Occlude in (5). We compute the circumscription using Proposition 2 of Lifschitz [22], which
reduces circumscription to predicate completion.
TALA3 Occlude(t, f ) def≡ ∃e, t1, t2 ((Initiates(e, f, t1) ∨ Terminates(e, f, t1)) ∧ Occurs(t1, t2, e) ∧ t1 < t ∧ t  t2)
The TAL 1.0 nochange axiom ¬Occlude(t + 1, f ) → (Holds(t + 1, f ) ↔ Holds(t, f )) [4, p. 30] is logically equiva-
lent to the conjunction of the axioms TALA4 and TALA5.
TALA4 Holds(t, f ) ∧ ¬Occlude(t + 1, f ) → Holds(t + 1, f )
TALA5 ¬Holds(t, f ) ∧ ¬Occlude(t + 1, f ) → ¬Holds(t + 1, f )
We continue with formulas (3) and (4).
TALA6 Occurs(t1, t2, e) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t1) → Holds(t2, f )
TALA7 Occurs(t1, t2, e) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t1) → ¬Holds(t2, f )
We finish with a constraint on the starting and ending timepoints of an event occurrence.
TALA8 Occurs(t1, t2, e) → t1 < t2
Let TALA be the formula generated by conjoining axioms TALA4 through TALA8 and then expanding the predicates
Holds, Occurs, and Occlude using definitions TALA1 through TALA3.
3.2. ECA axiomatization
There are two versions of the event calculus that support events with duration [26,37]. Both are candidates for
equivalence with TAL 1.0. We start by using the following axiomatization of the event calculus. It is obtained from
the version of the event calculus of Shanahan [37, p. 416] by eliminating Releases, and replacing InitiallyP, InitiallyN,
Clipped, and Declipped with definitions.
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ECA2 InitiallyN(f ) def≡ ¬HoldsAt(f,0)
ECA3 Clipped(t1, f, t4)
def≡ ∃e, t2, t3 (Happens3(e, t2, t3) ∧ t1 < t3 ∧ t2 < t4 ∧ Terminates(e, f, t2))
ECA4 Declipped(t1, f, t4)
def≡ ∃e, t2, t3 (Happens3(e, t2, t3) ∧ t1 < t3 ∧ t2 < t4 ∧ Initiates(e, f, t2))
ECA5 InitiallyP(f ) ∧ ¬Clipped(0, f, t) → HoldsAt(f, t)
ECA6 InitiallyN(f ) ∧ ¬Declipped(0, f, t) → ¬HoldsAt(f, t)
ECA7 Happens3(e, t1, t2) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t1) ∧ t2 < t3 ∧ ¬Clipped(t1, f, t3) → HoldsAt(f, t3)
ECA8 Happens3(e, t1, t2) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t1) ∧ t2 < t3 ∧ ¬Declipped(t1, f, t3) → ¬HoldsAt(f, t3)
ECA9 Happens3(e, t1, t2) → t1  t2
Let ECA be the formula generated by conjoining axioms ECA5 through ECA9 and then expanding the predicates
InitiallyP, InitiallyN, Clipped, and Declipped using definitions ECA1 through ECA4.
We can now proceed to our first result.
4. Lack of equivalence between TALA and ECA
In this section, we expose two differences between TALA and ECA. The first difference involves an occurrence
of an event that initiates a fluent, followed by another occurrence of an event that initiates the same fluent. In TALA,
the fluent is of indeterminate truth value within the durations of both event occurrences, whereas in ECA, it is only
of indeterminate truth value within the duration of the first event occurrence. Within the duration of the second event
occurrence, the fluent is true, because it was previously initiated and has not been clipped.
Theorem 1. TALA 
|= ECA.
Proof. Consider the following structure S:
Initiates = {〈I,F,1〉, 〈I,F,4〉} (6)
Terminates = ∅ (7)
Happens3 = {〈I,1,2〉, 〈I,4,5〉} (8)
HoldsAt = {〈F,3〉, 〈F,4〉, 〈F,6〉, 〈F,7〉, 〈F,8〉, . . .} (9)
We can show S |= TALA but S 
|= ECA. It is straightforward to verify S |= TALA. In order to show S 
|= ECA, it is
sufficient to show S 
|= ECA7. Moreover, we need only show
S 
|= Happens3(I,1,2) ∧ Initiates(I,F,1) ∧ 2 < 5 ∧ ¬Clipped(1,F,5) → HoldsAt(F,5) (10)
From (7), we have
S |= ¬∃e, t2, t3(Happens3(e, t2, t3) ∧ 1 < t3 ∧ t2 < 5 ∧ Terminates(e,F, t2))
From this and definition ECA3, we have S |= ¬Clipped(1,F,5). From this, (8), and (6), we have
S |= Happens3(I,1,2) ∧ Initiates(I,F,1) ∧ 2 < 5 ∧ ¬Clipped(1,F,5)
But from (9), we have S |= ¬HoldsAt(F,5). Therefore, we have (10). 
The second difference between TALA and ECA involves an occurrence of an event that initiates a fluent, which
overlaps in time an occurrence of an event that terminates the same fluent. In TALA, the fluent is true at the end of
the initiating event occurrence, whereas in ECA, the fluent is of indeterminate truth value at the end of the initiating
event occurrence.
Theorem 2. ECA 
|= TALA.
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Initiates = {〈I,F,1〉} (11)
Terminates = {〈T,F,2〉} (12)
Happens3 = {〈I,1,2〉, 〈T,2,3〉} (13)
HoldsAt = ∅ (14)
We can show S |= ECA but S 
|= TALA. It is straightforward to verify S |= ECA. In order to show S 
|= TALA, it is
sufficient to show S 
|= TALA6. Furthermore, we need only show
S 
|= Occurs(1,3, I ) ∧ Initiates(I,F,1) → Holds(3,F ) (15)
From (13), definition TALA2, and (11), we have Occurs(1,3, I ) ∧ Initiates(I,F,1). But from (14) and definition
TALA1, we have S |= ¬Holds(3,F ). Therefore, we have (15). 
Thus we have lack of equivalence.
Corollary 3. TALA is not logically equivalent to ECA.
Proof. This follows from either Theorem 1 or Theorem 2. 
5. ECB axiomatization
A second axiomatization of the event calculus that supports events with duration is provided by Miller and Shana-
han [26, pp. 470–471]. After rewriting it in the style of ECA, it is as follows.
ECB1 Clipped′(t1, f, t4)
def≡ ∃e, t2, t3(Happens3(e, t2, t3) ∧ t1  t3 ∧ t2 < t4 ∧ Terminates(e, f, t2))
ECB2 Declipped′(t1, f, t4)
def≡ ∃e, t2, t3(Happens3(e, t2, t3) ∧ t1  t3 ∧ t2 < t4 ∧ Initiates(e, f, t2))
ECB3 Clipped(t1, f, t4)
def≡ ∃e, t2, t3(Happens3(e, t2, t3) ∧ t1 < t3 ∧ t2 < t4 ∧ Terminates(e, f, t2))
ECB4 Declipped(t1, f, t4)
def≡ ∃e, t2, t3(Happens3(e, t2, t3) ∧ t1 < t3 ∧ t2 < t4 ∧ Initiates(e, f, t2))
ECB5 HoldsAt(f, t1) ∧ t1 < t2 ∧ ¬Clipped′(t1, f, t2) → HoldsAt(f, t2)
ECB6 ¬HoldsAt(f, t1) ∧ t1 < t2 ∧ ¬Declipped′(t1, f, t2) → ¬HoldsAt(f, t2)
ECB7 Happens3(e, t1, t2) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t1) ∧ t2 < t3 ∧ ¬Clipped(t1, f, t3) → HoldsAt(f, t3)
ECB8 Happens3(e, t1, t2) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t1) ∧ t2 < t3 ∧ ¬Declipped(t1, f, t3) → ¬HoldsAt(f, t3)
ECB9 Happens3(e, t1, t2) → t1  t2
ECB differs from ECA in the following ways:
• It eliminates the definitions of InitiallyP and InitiallyN.
• It add definitions of Clipped′ and Declipped′.
• It adds the axioms of inertia ECB5 and ECB6.
Let ECB be the formula generated by conjoining axioms ECB5 through ECB9 and then expanding the predicates
Clipped′, Declipped′, Clipped, and Declipped using definitions ECB1 through ECB4.
We then have our second result.
6. Lack of equivalence between TALA and ECB
ECB is not equivalent to TALA, for the two reasons previously given for ECA, as well as the following reason.
Consider a single occurrence of an event that initiates a fluent. Within the duration of the event occurrence, the fluent
is of indeterminate truth value in TALA, whereas in ECB a fluent that is true persists in each model because of the
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then it is true for all remaining timepoints within the event occurrence.
Theorem 4. TALA 
|= ECB.
Proof. Consider the following structure S:
Initiates = {〈I,F,1〉} (16)
Terminates = ∅ (17)
Happens3 = {〈I,1,3〉} (18)
HoldsAt = {〈F,2〉, 〈F,4〉, 〈F,5〉, 〈F,6〉, . . .} (19)
We can show S |= TALA but S 
|= ECB. It is straightforward to verify S |= TALA. In order to show S 
|= ECB, it is
sufficient to show S 
|= ECB5. Moreover, we need only show
S 
|= HoldsAt(F,2) ∧ 2 < 3 ∧ ¬Clipped′(2,F,3) → HoldsAt(F,3) (20)
From (17), we have
S |= ¬∃e, t2, t3(Happens3(e, t2, t3) ∧ 2 t3 ∧ t2 < 3 ∧ Terminates(e,F, t2))
From this and definition ECB1, we have S |= ¬Clipped′(2,F,3). From this and (19), we have
S |= HoldsAt(F,2) ∧ 2 < 3 ∧ ¬Clipped′(2,F,3)
But from (19), we have S |= ¬HoldsAt(F,3). Therefore, we have (20). 
Corollary 5. TALA is not logically equivalent to ECB.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 4. 
7. General action type specifications
We have shown that, if TAL action type specifications are of the form (1), then TAL and the event calculus are
not equivalent. What if we use a more general form of action type specification? Can we restore equivalence with the
event calculus?
The answer is no. It is sufficient to show that the difference highlighted in the proof of Theorem 2 cannot be erased.
ECA7 (as well as ECB7, which is identical) entails that, if a fluent is not clipped during an event occurrence that
initiates the fluent, then the fluent is true at the end of the event occurrence. Action type specifications of the form (1)
entail that the fluent is always true at the end of the event. We would like to add to the action type specification the
condition that the fluent is not clipped:
[t1, t2]I ¬∃t3, t4[[t3, t4]T ∧ t1 < t4 − 1 ∧ t3 < t2] → R([t2]F)
(I and T are actions, and F is a fluent.) Unfortunately, the consequent of an action type specification cannot contain
action occurrence statements such as [t3, t4]T [4, p. 28].
The underlying difficulty is that TAL does not have the notions of clipped and declipped. In order for TAL to
emulate the event calculus with events with duration, it would have to be extended with these notions.
8. Restriction to single-step actions
We now consider what happens if we restrict TAL and the event calculus to single-step actions. We add TALA9 to
TALA:
TALA1 Holds(t, f ) def≡ HoldsAt(f, t)
TALA2 Occurs(t1, t2, e)
def≡ Happens3(e, t1, t2 − 1)
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TALA4 Holds(t, f ) ∧ ¬Occlude(t + 1, f ) → Holds(t + 1, f )
TALA5 ¬Holds(t, f ) ∧ ¬Occlude(t + 1, f ) → ¬Holds(t + 1, f )
TALA6 Occurs(t1, t2, e) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t1) → Holds(t2, f )
TALA7 Occurs(t1, t2, e) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t1) → ¬Holds(t2, f )
TALA8 Occurs(t1, t2, e) → t1 < t2
TALA9 Occurs(t1, t2, e) → t2 = t1 + 1
Let TALAS be the formula generated by conjoining axioms TALA4 through TALA9 and then expanding the predicates
Holds, Occurs, and Occlude using definitions TALA1 through TALA3.
For single-step actions, the version of the event calculus that appears to be the most similar to TAL is the discrete
event calculus (DEC) [27,29]. DEC was developed to improve the efficiency of automated reasoning in the event
calculus. It improves efficiency by limiting time to the integers, and eliminating triply quantified time from many
of the axioms. Mueller [27] proves that, for integer time and single-step events, DEC is logically equivalent to an
extended version of ECB [26].
The following axiomatization is obtained from the full version of DEC by eliminating Trajectory, AntiTrajectory,
Releases, and ReleasedAt.
DECA1 Happens(e, t) def≡ Happens3(e, t, t)
DECA2 HoldsAt(f, t) ∧ ¬∃e(Happens(e, t) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t)) → HoldsAt(f, t + 1)
DECA3 ¬HoldsAt(f, t) ∧ ¬∃e(Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t)) → ¬HoldsAt(f, t + 1)
DECA4 Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t) → HoldsAt(f, t + 1)
DECA5 Happens(e, t) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t) → ¬HoldsAt(f, t + 1)
DECA6 Happens3(e, t1, t2) → t1 = t2
Let DECA be the formula generated by conjoining axioms DECA2 through DECA6 and then expanding the predicate
Happens using definition DECA1.
We then obtain our final result.
9. Equivalence of TALAS and DECA
We can show that TALAS and DECA are logically equivalent. First, we prove a number of lemmas.
Lemma 6. TALAS |= DECA2.
Proof. Suppose TALAS. Let f be an arbitrary fluent and t be an arbitrary timepoint. We must show HoldsAt(f, t) ∧
¬∃e(Happens(e, t) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t)) → HoldsAt(f, t + 1). Suppose
HoldsAt(f, t) (21)
¬∃e(Happens(e, t) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t)) (22)
We consider two cases.
Case 1: ∃e(Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t)).
From definition DECA1, TALA2, and existential instantiation, we get Occurs(t, t + 1,E) ∧ Initiates(E,f, t) for
some E. From this, TALA6, and TALA1, we have HoldsAt(f, t + 1), as required.
Case 2: ¬∃e(Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t)).
From (22), definition DECA1, and TALA2, we get
¬∃e((Initiates(e, f, t) ∨ Terminates(e, f, t)) ∧ Occurs(t, t + 1, e))
Therefore,
t1 = t ∧ t2 = t1 + 1 → ¬((Initiates(e, f, t1) ∨ Terminates(e, f, t1)) ∧ Occurs(t1, t2, e)) (23)
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= t1 + 1 → ¬Occurs(t1, t2, e). Hence,
t2 
= t1 + 1 → ¬((Initiates(e, f, t1) ∨ Terminates(e, f, t1)) ∧ Occurs(t1, t2, e))
From this and (23), we have
t2 
= t1 + 1 ∨ t1 = t → ¬((Initiates(e, f, t1) ∨ Terminates(e, f, t1)) ∧ Occurs(t1, t2, e)) (24)
We can show
t1 < t + 1 ∧ t + 1 t2 → t2 
= t1 + 1 ∨ t1 = t (25)
which is logically equivalent to t1 < t + 1 ∧ t + 1 t2 ∧ t2 = t1 + 1 → t1 = t . To see this, suppose
t1 < t + 1 (26)
t + 1 t2 (27)
t2 = t1 + 1 (28)
From (27) and (28), we get t  t1. From this and (26), we have t1 = t , as required.
From (25) and (24), we have
t1 < t + 1 ∧ t + 1 t2 → ¬((Initiates(e, f, t1) ∨ Terminates(e, f, t1)) ∧ Occurs(t1, t2, e)) (29)
From this and TALA3, we get ¬Occlude(t + 1, f ). From this, (21), TALA1, and TALA4, we have HoldsAt(f, t + 1),
as required. 
Lemma 7. TALAS |= DECA3.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 6, except that ¬HoldsAt is substituted for HoldsAt, Initiates and
Terminates are swapped, TALA7 is substituted for TALA6, and TALA5 is substituted for TALA4. 
Lemma 8. TALAS |= DECA4.
Proof. Suppose TALAS. Let e be an arbitrary event, f be an arbitrary fluent, and t be an arbitrary timepoint. We
must show Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t) → HoldsAt(f, t + 1). Suppose Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t). From
Happens(e, t), definition DECA1, and TALA2, we get Occurs(t, t + 1, e). From this, Initiates(e, f, t), TALA6, and
TALA1, we have HoldsAt(f, t + 1). 
Lemma 9. TALAS |= DECA5.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 8, except that ¬HoldsAt is substituted for HoldsAt, Terminates is
substituted for Initiates, and TALA7 is substituted for TALA6. 
Lemma 10. TALAS |= DECA6.
Proof. This follows from TALA9 and TALA2. 
Now we consider the other direction.
Lemma 11. DECA |= TALA4.
Proof. Suppose DECA. Let f be an arbitrary fluent and t be an arbitrary timepoint. We must show Holds(t, f ) ∧
¬Occlude(t + 1, f ) → Holds(t + 1, f ). Suppose
Holds(t, f ) (30)
¬Occlude(t + 1, f ) (31)
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¬∃e, t1, t2((Initiates(e, f, t1) ∨ Terminates(e, f, t1)) ∧ Occurs(t1, t2, e) ∧ t1 < t + 1 ∧ t + 1 t2)
Hence, ¬∃e(Terminates(e, f, t) ∧ Occurs(t, t + 1, e)). From this, definition TALA2, and DECA1, we get ¬∃e
(Happens(e, t) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t)). From this, (30), definition TALA1, and DECA2, we have Holds(t + 1, f ),
as required. 
Lemma 12. DECA |= TALA5.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 11, except that ¬Holds is substituted for Holds, Initiates and
Terminates are swapped, and DECA3 is substituted for DECA2. 
Lemma 13. DECA |= TALA6.
Proof. Suppose DECA. Let e be an arbitrary event, f be an arbitrary fluent, and t1 and t2 be arbitrary timepoints. We
must show Occurs(t1, t2, e) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t1) → Holds(t2, f ). Suppose Occurs(t1, t2, e) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t1). From
Occurs(t1, t2, e) and definition TALA2, we have Happens3(e, t1, t2 − 1). From this and DECA6, we get t2 = t1 + 1.
From this, Happens3(e, t1, t2 − 1), and DECA1, we have Happens(e, t1). From this, Initiates(e, f, t1), DECA4, and
definition TALA1, we get Holds(t1 + 1, f ). From this and t2 = t1 + 1, we have Holds(t2, f ). 
Lemma 14. DECA |= TALA7.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 13, except that ¬Holds is substituted for Holds, Terminates is substi-
tuted for Initiates, and DECA5 is substituted for DECA4. 
Lemma 15. DECA |= TALA8.
Proof. This follows from definition TALA2 and DECA6. 
Lemma 16. DECA |= TALA9.
Proof. This follows from definition TALA2 and DECA6. 
Now we proceed to the equivalence theorem.
Theorem 17. TALAS is logically equivalent to DECA.
Proof. We prove the two directions separately.
(TALAS |= DECA) Suppose TALAS. Then DECA2, DECA3, DECA4, DECA5, and DECA6 follow from Lem-
mas 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, respectively.
(DECA |= TALAS) Suppose DECA. Then TALA4, TALA5, TALA6, TALA7, TALA8, and TALA9 follow from
Lemmas 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, respectively. 
10. Conclusions
We have investigated the relationship between the event calculus and TAL. We started by restricting both for-
malisms to their common features, and found that the resulting versions of the formalisms are not equivalent. We
then further restricted the event calculus and TAL to single-step actions, and proved that these versions are logically
equivalent.
Some areas for further work are the following:
• Lesser restrictions than the restriction to single-step actions could be explored. It may be possible to show a form
of equivalence between TAL and the event calculus with events with duration if there are no overlapping events.
1028 E.T. Mueller / Artificial Intelligence 170 (2006) 1017–1029• Hybrids of the event calculus and TAL could be created.
• The relationships between other pairs of formalisms for reasoning about action and change could be explored.
Correspondences could be developed between the event calculus and action language C+, and between the situa-
tion calculus and temporal action logics.
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Appendix A. Translation from TAL 1.0 L(ND) to L(FL)
The important translation rules from TAL 1.0 L(ND) to L(FL) are as follows [5, pp. 6–9]:
• If α is an action occurrence statement, then Trans(α β) = Trans(α) → Trans(β). If disjunction (∨) is used
in β , it must be in the scope of an R, I , or X reassignment operator so that circumscription of Occlude can be
computed using predicate completion [22].
• If α is an action, then Trans([τ, τ ′]α) = Occurs(τ, τ ′, α).
• Trans(R((τ, τ ′]α)) = Trans(X((τ, τ ′]α) ∧ [τ ′]α).
• Trans(R([τ ]α)) = Trans(X([τ ]α) ∧ [τ ]α).
• Trans(I ((τ, τ ′]α)) = Trans(X((τ, τ ′]α) ∧ (τ, τ ′]α).
• Trans(X((τ, τ ′]α)) = ∀t (τ < t ∧ t  τ ′ → Trans(X([t]α))).
• Trans(X([τ ]¬α)) = Trans(X([τ ]α)).
• If ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}, then Trans(X([τ ]α ⊗ β)) = Trans(X([τ ]α)) ∧ Trans(X([τ ]β)).
• If Q ∈ {∃,∀}, then Trans(X([τ ]Qν[α])) =Qν(Trans(X([τ ]α))).
• If α is a fluent, then Trans(X([τ ]α)) = Occlude(τ,α).
• Trans([τ ]¬α) = ¬Trans([τ ]α).
• If ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}, then Trans([τ ]α ⊗ β) = Trans([τ ]α) ⊗ Trans([τ ]β).
• If Q ∈ {∃,∀}, then Trans([τ ]Qν[α]) =Qν(Trans([τ ]α)).
• If α is a fluent, then Trans([τ ]α) = Holds(τ,α).
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